GEORGEK (DO NOT DELETE)

1/10/2014 3:47 PM

A LITTLE LIGHT ON THE MAYO: JUSTIFYING REVERSAL OF
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR
PATHOLOGY DECISION
Kevin J. Georgek*
I. INTRODUCTION
Patents grant their owners the right to exclude others from
1
practicing a claimed invention for a limited time. Whether patents
actually protect the economic interests of their owners, provide
incentive for innovation, and foster economic growth has been
2
extensively debated. There are undisputedly, however, times when
the same patents that may protect an entity’s exclusive interest in a
claimed invention—to an important, lifesaving therapy for instance—
simultaneously deprive others of access to that very invention,
3
resulting in significant harm to those excluded. Precedent indicates,
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; 2010 B.S., Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute.
1
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Boomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852)
(defining a patent as a franchise granting “the right to exclude everyone from
making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the
patentee”).
2
See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An
Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 116–17 (2010) (asserting
that patents afford inventors—particularly small firms and individuals—a degree of
insulation from competitors who seek to sell the same invention at a lower price in
the marketplace and that this protection from competition spurs innovation by
enabling inventors to recover development costs without fearing that competitors
will unduly benefit from their innovative ideas); see also Andrew W. Torrance & Bill
Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130,
131 (2009) (offering empirical data to debunk the “orthodox assumption that
technological innovation can be encouraged through the prospect of patent
protection”).
3
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F.
App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (listing parties who face prohibitive costs of obtaining
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic testing as a result of their insurance companies’ failure
to cover the cost of testing and by their inability to pursue alternative testing or
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and policy dictates, that when a patent has the potential to inhibit
subsequent advances in a given field to the detriment of researchers
and patients, a modification to the traditional calculus for
4
determining whether subject matter is patent eligible is warranted.
This modification involves broadening the scope of appropriate
considerations to encompass extra-statutory concerns.
The merits of gene patenting, and the broader issue of subjectmatter eligibility generally, have been at the center of many recent
5
debates. This Comment seeks to provide an overview of subjectmatter-eligibility jurisprudence leading up to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit’s (Federal Circuit) decision in Association for
Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (Ass’n for
6
Molecular Pathology). It also suggests that the Supreme Court—by
granting certiorari in this case on the question of whether human
genes are patentable—had an opportunity to clarify the appropriate
analysis for determining whether the subject matter at issue in Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology is patent eligible. Part II of this Comment
provides a historical perspective into the development of modern
subject-matter-eligibility jurisprudence and details the approach the
Supreme Court adopted in Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus
7
Laboratories., Inc. (“Mayo”), a recent case concerning patent
eligibility. Part III discusses Ass’n for Molecular Pathology and details
the method for determining patent eligibility that the Federal Circuit
advanced in that case. Part IV argues that the Federal Circuit erred
in its dismissive treatment of the effect of Mayo on Ass’n for Molecular

obtain second opinions on test results since the patent holder is the only provider of
testing services in the United States).
4
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
5
See generally Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Derail the Next Generation
of Genetic Technologies?: A Reassessment of the Evidence Suggests Not, 80 UMKC L. REV. 563
(2012); Abigail Lauer, Comment, The Disparate Effects of Gene Patents on Different
Categories of Scientific Research, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2011); W. Nicholson Price II,
Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and
Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601 (2012).
6
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013). Given the extensive procedural history of this case, a point of clarification at
this juncture is warranted. Whenever this Comment refers to “Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology,” it is discussing the Federal Circuit’s second opinion in the case following
remand by the Supreme Court.
7
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012).
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Pathology because neither Supreme Court nor Federal Circuit
precedent supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different claim
types in isolation. Accordingly, this section describes three opinions
from Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent which explicitly
recognize that concerns raised in the context of one type of patent
8
claim are applicable in the context of different claim types. Part IV
also discusses the Supreme Court’s repeated disinclination to adhere
to rigid tests promulgated by the Federal Circuit in favor of more
nuanced and holistic analyses—particularly in the areas of subjectmatter eligibility and obviousness. Part V discusses the Supreme
Court’s grant of certiorari in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology on the
question of whether human genes are patentable and argues that
although the Court ultimately reached the correct result, it failed to
address the appropriate role of policy considerations in the patent
eligibility analysis.
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the Federal Circuit’s
dismissive treatment of Mayo contravenes Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit precedent, which dictates that the reservations the Court
expressed in refusing to uphold Mayo’s method claims are applicable
to the composition claims in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology.
Additionally, important policy considerations, including the harmful
effects of gene patents on genetic research, test quality, and patient
access to testing, compel the conclusion that the claims at issue in this
case should be rendered ineligible for patent protection. Finally, the
Supreme Court’s consistent skepticism of strict tests promulgated by
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court’s decision to address on
certiorari the broad question of whether human genes are
9
patentable, signal that the Court should not have limited its analysis
of patent eligibility to the text of the statute, but rather weighed
important extra-statutory concerns into the subject-matter-eligibility
analysis.

8

See F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. SMITH,
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 92–95 (Robert C. Clark et. al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) (noting
that patent claims are primarily characterized as one of five types including:
composition, process (or method), apparatus, product-by-process, or means-plusfunction).
9
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part.
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II. PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Early Cases
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the power “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their
10
respective . . . Discoveries.”
Congress, in turn, codified laws
governing the award of these exclusive rights in Title 35 of the
11
United States Code. The types of discoveries that are entitled to
receive this protection are described in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (section 101),
which provides: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
12
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” While this
13
courts have
language has often been interpreted broadly,
nonetheless consistently recognized implicit limitations to the scope
of patentable subject matter, often stating that laws of nature, natural
14
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.
15
Nature’s handiwork is not patent eligible. Manifestations of the
laws of nature such as “the heat of the sun, electricity, [and] the
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
16
men . . . and [are] reserved exclusively to none.” Material derived
from natural sources which is then transformed or reduced into a
17
form that possesses characteristics markedly different from those of
10

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
12
Id.
13
See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
14
Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (awarding a patent for a
process of curing synthetic rubber, which, despite employing a well-known
mathematical formula, applied it in a process that when considered as a whole is
patent eligible), and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (upholding
the award of a patent directed to a live, human-made microorganism capable of
breaking down crude oil—a property that no naturally occurring bacteria possess),
with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (holding that a formula for computing
alarm limits—absent any disclosure relating to the chemical processes employed, the
method for monitoring variables, or the means of setting off the alarm—was not
patent eligible), and Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle . . . is a
fundamental truth . . . [which] cannot be patented, as no one can claim in . . . them
an exclusive right.”).
15
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
16
Id. at 130.
17
Although the precise threshold beyond which a composition becomes
“markedly different” than any naturally existing composition remains elusive, the
11
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the material as it exists in nature, however, has long been recognized
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as
18
patent eligible. While the precise boundaries of what constitutes
“markedly different” subject matter remain unclear, the Federal
Circuit defined a “markedly different” molecule as one that has “a
distinct[] chemical structure and identity” from naturally occurring
19
molecules.
While section 101 does not, on its face, declare living matter
patent eligible, the Plant Patents Act of 1930—which declared that
plants were eligible for patenting if they could be reproduced
asexually—broadened the scope of patentable subject matter to
include a form of living matter that had not undergone an extraction
20
or a purification step, but that existed purely in its natural form.
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 also recognized that certain
forms of live plants were eligible for protection, but explicitly
21
declared that bacteria were outside the scope of the Act. Bacteria
were shortly thereafter determined to be within the scope of patenteligible subject matter, provided that they displayed “markedly
22
different characteristics from any [bacteria] found in nature.” The
prohibition on patenting laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and
abstract ideas standing alone also encompasses methods and
Federal Circuit illustrated by way of analogy to case law that it lies somewhere
between non-markedly different combinations of existing molecules and markedly
different genetically engineered molecules. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in
part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
18
See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562
(1908) (stating that in order to overcome the bar on patenting products of nature,
an inventor must prove that the product for which he seeks a patent has become a
new and distinct article with new characteristics or uses); Park-Davis & Co. v. Mulford
& Co., 196 F. 496, 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding that patents claiming a derivative of
crystalline adrenaline, extracted from suprarenal tissue in animals for use as an agent
to increase blood pressure, were valid); U.S. Patent #135,245 (claiming a form of
brewer’s yeast “free from organic germs of disease”—despite the fact that brewer’s
yeast existed in nature—which could be used to brew beer that was easier to
preserve).
19
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 689 F.3d at 1328.
20
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (2006)).
21
Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1930)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2006)) (“The breeder of any
sexually or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has so
reproduced the variety . . . shall be entitled to plant variety protection for the
variety . . . .”).
22
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
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23

processes that include this subject matter within their scope. Such
subject matter is only eligible for patenting if, when considered as a
whole, the patent describes an application of the law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea, and does not simply attempt to claim
24
the naturally existing subject matter itself.
Currently, the USPTO characterizes isolated DNA that encodes
25
specific genes as patent-eligible subject matter. The USPTO’s Utility
Examination Guidelines instruct that “an inventor’s discovery of a
gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition
isolated from its natural state and processed through purifying steps
that separate the gene from other molecules naturally associated with
26
it.” While these Guidelines do not have the binding effect of law,
they nevertheless remain influential in that a reviewing court may
27
defer to the agency’s interpretation of a statute it oversees. Despite
their influence, however, the scope of the rights the Guidelines
28
confer to a patent holder remains unclear.
In addition to its reliance on the USPTO’s Utility Examination
Guidelines, the Federal Circuit—in determining that the isolated
DNA at issue in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology was patent eligible—
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Funk Brothers.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (Funk Bros.) and Diamond v. Chakrabarty
“set out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of
29
compositions of matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”
As
23

See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
Id. (emphasis added).
25
See Eric J. Rogers, Comment, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 28 (2010).
26
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Dep’t of Commerce, RIN 0651-AB09, UTILITY
EXAMINATION GUIDELINES (2001).
27
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referring to
the Utility Examination Guidelines).
28
See Peter Edwards, Comment, AMP v. Myriad: The Future of Medicine and Patent
Law, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 811, 818 (2011) (noting the lack of clarity in the
language of the Guidelines which provides that while the holder of a gene patent has
the right to exclude others from using that gene, the patent holder must also
promote discovery of other uses of the gene by other researchers. The Guidelines’
lack of clarity is also evident in the language which instructs that while genes are
patentable, neither the DNA sequences nor the underlying genetic information are
patentable. Edwards notes that “it is not clear what the researcher is patenting in a
gene, however, if not genetic information”).
29
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326..
24
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such, a detailed discussion of these cases is warranted.
In 1948, the Supreme Court weighed in on the distinction
between patent-eligible subject matter and unpatentable products of
30
nature in Funk Bros. Kalo initiated a lawsuit against Funk Bros.,
31
alleging that it infringed Kalo’s patent for a bacterial inoculant for
32
use with leguminous plants.
Prior to the invention, in order to
optimize legume growth, farmers were required to select the optimal
strain of bacteria from a group of at least six species which
33
corresponded with their desired legume. Mixed bacterial cultures
largely proved ineffective because the bacteria, when mixed,
produced inhibitory effects on each other, resulting in reduced levels
34
of plant growth.
The invention in this case was a mixture of
Rhizobium bacteria that did not display the commonly observed
35
inhibitory effects of each other on legumes. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the inventor “[did] not create [the] state of
36
inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria.” As justification for
the Court’s conclusion that “[the bacteria’s] qualities are the work of
nature . . . . [and] [t]hose qualities are of course not patentable,” the
Court reasoned that “the combination of species produces no new
bacteria, no change in the species of bacteria, and no enlargement of
37
the range of their utility.” The Court further characterized the
bacteria as “manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and
38
reserved exclusively to none.”
30

333 U.S. 127 (1948).
The Court offered the following description of the challenged invention: “An
inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually noninhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains
being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the
leguminous plant for which they are specific.” Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 127 n.1. An
alternative explanation of the process of bacterial inoculation can be found at:
http://www.ctahr.hawaii.edu/bnf/Downloads/Training/Legume%20use/Title.Pdf
(explaining that increasing the concentration of Rhizobia, unique bacteria that
naturally exists in the soil, can result in the infection of the root hairs of legumes.
This infection results in the formation of nitrogen-fixing nodules which act as “small
nitrogen factories” that produce proteins essential for plant growth).
32
See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128.
33
Id. at 129 (explaining that “[n]o one species [of bacteria] will infect the roots
of all species of leguminous plants. But each [species of bacteria] will infect welldefined groups of those plants . . . . Thus if a farmer had crops of clover, alfalfa, and
soy beans he would have to use three separate inoculants.”).
34
Id. at 129–30.
35
Id. at 130.
36
Id.
37
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
38
Id. at 130.
31
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The difficult task of discerning an unpatentable product of
nature from a patentable product of human ingenuity was again
39
before the Court in Chakrabarty.
Ananda Chakrabarty, a
microbiologist at General Electric, sought to patent a genetically
40
engineered bacterium that was capable of breaking down crude oil.
The Court again recognized the limits to patentability, stating:
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas
have been held not patentable. . . . Thus, a new mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is
not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not
2
patent his celebrated law that E=mc ; nor could Newton
41
have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are
“manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved
42
exclusively to none.”
In this case, however, the Court ultimately upheld the patent,
finding that “the patentee has produced a new bacterium with
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one
having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not
nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject
43
matter under section 101.” In formulating its conclusion, the Court
looked in part to the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952
Patent Act, which indicated that Congress intended patentable
subject matter to broadly “include anything under the sun that is
44
made by man.”
In sum, while the patent in Funk Bros. attempted to claim a mere
mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, the patent in Chakrabarty was
directed to a new bacterium which exhibited characteristics not
found in nature. Notably, the Court approached Funk Bros. and
39

See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
The Court offered the following explanation of the claimed invention:
“Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate from the chromosomes of the cell.
In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids control the
oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria. In particular, the two researchers
discovered plasmids capable of degrading camphor and octane, two components of
crude oil. In the work represented by the patent application at issue here,
Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of
degrading four different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained
stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterium, which itself has no capacity for degrading
oil.” Id. at 305 n.1.
41
Id. at 309.
42
Id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130).
43
Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
44
Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)); see infra note 187 and accompanying text.
40
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Chakrabarty in a similar fashion; primarily relying on a comparison
between the function of the claimed invention with the function of a
naturally occurring analogue.
It is not immediately apparent where Myriad’s isolated DNA fits
along the spectrum delineated by Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty.
Whether the isolated DNA at issue has a “distinct chemical structure
and identity” and meets the Federal Circuit’s definition of “markedly
different” is open to debate. However, determining whether isolated
BRCA1/2 DNA surpasses the elusive “markedly different” threshold is
not determinative of patent eligibility. The Supreme Court—in
reviewing the issues presented in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology on
certiorari and ultimately vacating the Federal Circuit’s ruling—
declined to confine its analysis to the cases offered by the Federal
45
Circuit. Instead, on remand, the Court advised that the Federal
Circuit consider the issues in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology in light of its
46
recent decision in Mayo —a case that recognized a more nuanced set
of criteria for determining patent eligibility than the test advanced in
47
Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty.
B. Subject-Matter Eligibility in Mayo
Prometheus Laboratories develops products that enable
physicians to detect, diagnose, and treat disorders in the fields of
48
gastroenterology and oncology. It also specializes in personalized
medicine—a method of using an individual’s unique serologic,
genetic, and inflammation markers to diagnose certain disorders and
49
predict treatment outcomes. The Prometheus patents at issue in
this case were directed to a method for administering thiopurine
50
drugs, one that sought to maximize the efficacy of the drugs for
each individual patient by accounting for individuals’ different rates
51
The following claim in the
of metabolizing thiopurines.
45

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012).
46
See id.
47
See infra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
48
See About Prometheus, PROMETHEUSLABS.COM, http://www.prometheuslabs.com
/About.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
49
See Diagnostics, PROMETHEUSPATIENTS.COM, http://www.prometheuspatients
.com/Products_Diagnostics.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
50
Thiopurines are a class of synthetic drugs used to treat immune mediated
gastro-intestinal disorders including Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. See
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”).
51
See id.
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Prometheus patent describes the invention and is one of the claims at
issue:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment
of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level of
6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
8
less than about 230 pmol per 8x10 red blood cells indicates
a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject and wherein the level of 68
thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x10 red
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said
52
drug subsequently administered to said subject.
Prometheus initiated an infringement lawsuit when Mayo
Medical Laboratories announced that it planned to introduce its own
test to the marketplace—one which used slightly higher thiopurine
53
metabolite levels to measure toxicity. Mayo moved for summary
judgment, alleging that the Prometheus patents were invalid because
they impermissibly claimed the “correlation between the recited
metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy and/or toxicity,” which it
alleged was an unpatentable “natural, observable phenomenon” and
54
that “the patents impermissibly preempt use of the correlation.”
Thus, Mayo argued that the Prometheus patents did not preclude
55
them from marketing their test.
The district court granted Mayo’s motion, finding that
Prometheus’s claims reciting correlations between thiopurine drug
metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity were directed to
56
natural phenomena. On appeal, the Federal Circuit—relying on
57
the machine-or-transformation (M or T) test —reversed the district
58
court’s decision. As understood by the Federal Circuit, the M or T
52

U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); see infra notes 80–82 and
accompanying text.
53
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04CV1200, 2008 WL
878910, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“Prometheus II”).
54
Id. at *5 (quoting Doc. No. 502 at 11, 13).
55
See id.
56
See id. at *6, *14.
57
See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
58
See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”).

GEORGEKGEORGEK PROOF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

COMMENT

1/10/2014 3:47 PM

181

test provided that, “a claimed process is surely patent-eligible under
section 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
59
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”
The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that Prometheus’s method
60
claims satisfied the M or T test and were therefore patent eligible.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Federal Circuit determined
that the Prometheus patents fell within the scope of section 101
because both the “administering” and “determining” steps
“‘transform an article into a different state or thing’ and this
61
transformation ‘is central to the purpose of the claimed process.’”
Regarding the “administering” step, the Federal Circuit recognized
that “the human body necessarily undergoes a transformation [when
drugs are administered]” and dismissed “the fact that the change of
the administered drug to its metabolite relies on natural process” as
62
dispositive of patent ineligibility.
The court characterized the
transformation in this case as “the result of the physical
administration of a drug to a subject to transform—i.e., treat—the
63
subject, which is itself not a natural process.” The Federal Circuit
also found the “determining” step of Prometheus’s claimed method
64
The court stated that
to be “transformative and central.”
“[d]etermining the levels of [a drug] in a subject necessarily involves
a transformation, for those levels cannot be determined by mere
65
inspection.” Rather, this determination requires a certain amount
of manipulation in the form of extracting the metabolites from the
66
human body and determining their concentration.
The Federal
Circuit dismissed Mayo’s additional argument that the Prometheus
patents preempted a natural phenomenon by stating that “because
the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test, they do not
67
preempt a fundamental principle.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
held that Prometheus’s claims were properly directed to patent-

59

Id. at 1342 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
60
See id. at 1350.
61
Id. at 1345 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
62
Id. at 1346.
63
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”).
64
Id. at 1347.
65
Id.
66
See id.
67
Id. at 1349.
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eligible subject matter.
The Supreme Court, having re-visited the question of subjectmatter eligibility in its Bilski v. Kappos decision, which it handed down
the day before, granted certiorari in the Mayo case, vacated the
Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case to the Federal
68
Circuit for further consideration in light of Bilski.
In its Bilski
decision, the Supreme Court addressed the patent eligibility of
69
business methods. The claims at issue were directed to a method of
risk hedging in commodities markets, which initiate a series of
transactions between commodity providers and consumers who had a
certain risk position, identify market participants for the commodity
who had a corresponding counter-risk position, and initiate a series
of transactions between the commodity providers and market
70
participants. The Court ultimately determined that the claims were
drawn towards the concept of hedging risk—an unpatentable,
71
abstract idea. Notably, the Court also held that the M or T test is
not the sole test for patent eligibility under section 101, but rather is
a “useful and important clue, an investigative tool” for determining
72
patent eligibility. On remand, the Federal Circuit applied largely
the same analysis that it did in its first Mayo decision, again holding
that the claims recited patent-eligible subject matter under section
73
74
101 and again relying on the M or T test to reach that conclusion.
On March 20, 2012, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit’s decision and held that Prometheus’s claims were
not properly drawn to patent-eligible subject matter under section
75
101. Rather, the Court determined the patents effectively claimed
ineligible laws of nature that described the relationships between
76
levels of thiopurine metabolites and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court questioned whether “the
patent claims add enough to their statement of the correlations to
68

See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543
(2010).
69
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
70
See id. at 3223–24.
71
See id. at 3231.
72
Id. at 3227.
73
See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (“Prometheus IV”).
74
See id. at 1355 (stating that Prometheus’s claimed methods “satisfy the
transformation prong” of the M or T test).
75
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012).
76
See id. at 1305.
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allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible
77
processes that apply natural laws.” The Court, turning first to the
“administering” step, stated that it “simply refer[red] to the relevant
audience”—namely, doctors who are familiar with using thiopurines
78
to treat patients. The Court noted that merely limiting the use of an
abstract idea to a predefined technological environment is not
enough to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract
79
ideas. Turning to the wherein clauses in the Prometheus patent on
page ten supra, the Court dismissed the possibility that they could
change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application by
summarily stating that they “simply tell a doctor about the relevant
80
natural laws . . . .” Finally, the Court understood the determining
step to instruct the doctor to “engage in well-understood, routine,
81
conventional activity.” The Court ultimately determined that none
of the administering, determining, or wherein limitations standing
alone or in combination “[were] sufficient to transform unpatentable
natural correlations into patentable applications of those
82
regularities.”
The Court suggested additional justifications for its conclusion
that Prometheus’s patents concerned ineligible subject matter from
two cases dealing with the patent eligibility of processes using
mathematical formulas which, like laws of nature, are not patentable
83
standing alone. First, the Court stated that Prometheus’s claims
“present[] a case for patentability that is weaker than Diehr’s patent84
eligible claim and no stronger than Flook’s unpatentable one.”
85
While Diehr and Flook have proven difficult to reconcile, developing
77

Id. at 1297.
Id.
79
See id. at 1291 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
80
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1291.
81
Id. at 1298 (stating that this “activity” involves determining levels of thiopurine
metabolites in the blood—a routine and well-known step in the process for
measuring toxicity).
82
See id.
83
See id. at 1292.
84
Id.
85
See Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud: The Future of
Intellectual Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 589 (2011) (noting
that Diehr and Flook had “very similar facts” with opposite results); Mark A. Lemley,
Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011) (noting that the claims in Diehr and
Flook are “exactly parallel”); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program Related Inventions, 39 EMORY
L.J. 1025, 1104 (“[P]ost-Benson case law is replete with awkward distinctions and
78
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a complete understanding of the Court’s rationale for its holding in
Mayo requires a closer examination of these cases.
In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered the patentability of a
method for updating alarm limits for a catalytic chemical conversion
of hydrocarbons, in which the only point of novelty over prior, well86
known methods for changing alarm limits was the inventor’s
87
The entire process
employment of a mathematical formula.
consisted of essentially three steps, including “an initial step which
merely measures the present value of the process variable (e.g., the
temperature); an intermediate step which uses an algorithm to
calculate an updated alarm-limit value; and a final step in which the
88
actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value.” The Court
noted that the plain language of section 101 does not indicate
whether the claimed method—characterized only by the novel use of
89
a mathematical formula—was patent-eligible subject matter. It also
acknowledged that “[t]he line between a patentable process and an
90
unpatentable principle is not always clear.” The Court stated that
because mathematical formulas are not eligible for patenting by
91
themselves, the question in this case was whether “post–solution
applications of . . . a formula makes [a] method eligible for patent
92
protection.” Ultimately, the Court answered its own question in the
negative, characterizing the claimed process as accomplishing
nothing more than “provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula for
93
computing an updated alarm limit.”
Three years after the Court decided Flook, it was again tasked
with determining the patent eligibility of a process which employed a
94
mathematical equation.
The claimed process was a method for

results that are often difficult to reconcile.”).
86
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (offering an explanation of an
alarm limit as a predetermined number that, when exceeded by certain process
variables such as pressure and temperature during the process of catalytic
conversion, signals either irregularities in the process or the presence of potential
dangers).
87
See id. at 586–87.
88
Id. at 585.
89
Id. at 588.
90
Id. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
Id. at 585 (“In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d
273, we held that the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical formula may not
be patented.”).
92
Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added).
93
Id. at 586.
94
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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curing rubber which used certain instruments to continuously
monitor the temperature inside a mold cavity, transmit the
95
information to a digital computer, and send signals to open the
96
mold at the appropriate time. Unlike in Flook, the Diehr patent did
not attempt to claim a well-known equation itself, nor did it seek to
preempt further use of that equation. Rather, the applicants sought
only “to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction
97
with all of the other steps in their claimed process.” The Court held
that the claimed process was patent eligible, stating that it did “not
view [the] claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but
rather to [claim] an industrial process for the molding of rubber
98
products . . . .” In sum, the Court stated that its opinions in Flook
and Diehr were consistent with the Court’s general position that
“simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
99
cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”
As a final justification for its holding in Mayo, the Court
recognized that its subject-matter-eligibility jurisprudence has
“repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of
100
nature.” The Court was concerned that “because [natural] laws and
principles are ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work,’
there is a danger that granting patents that tie up their use will
101
inhibit future innovation . . . .” Prometheus’s claims implicated this
concern because “telling a doctor to measure metabolite levels and to
consider the resulting measurements in light of the correlations they
describe . . . tie[s] up his subsequent treatment decision regardless of
whether he changes his dosage in the light of the inference he draws
95

Id. at 177 n.2 (indicating that the computer made continuous adjustments to
the cure time by employing the Arrhenius equation, which can be expressed as ln v =
CZ + x where ln v is the natural log of the total required cure time, v; C is the
activation constant; Z is the temperature in the mold; and x is a constant dependent
on the geometry of the mold in the press).
96
Id. at 177–79.
97
Id. at 187.
98
Id. at 192–93.
99
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300
(2012) (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 64, 65, 67, 93 (1972); and Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010),
supporting the Court’s general view that appending conventional steps to laws of
nature does not make those ideas patent eligible).
100
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
101
Id. at 1292 (quoting Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
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102

using the correlations.” The Court clearly expressed a concern that
declaring Prometheus’s claims eligible for patenting would impede
the development of subsequent treatment methods that combine
103
Prometheus’s claimed correlations with other discoveries.
This
concern over the inhibitory effect on subsequent research and
development that would result from awarding patent protection to
the technology in Mayo seems to conflict with the Court’s assertion in
the final sentence of the Mayo opinion that “[w]e need not determine
here whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection for
104
discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.”
The Court
made clear earlier in the opinion that tying up the use of natural laws
“threaten[s] to inhibit the development of more refined treatment
105
recommendations”
and “impedes progress more than it . . .
106
promote[s] it.” Regardless of whether the Court characterizes its
concern as one rooted in policy or a desire to avoid frustrating
scientific progress, the Court’s holding in Mayo is undeniably
founded on considerations external to the minimal requirements
enumerated in section 101. Mayo provides that courts determining
patent eligibility should consider the invention not only in light of
section 101 and cases that have interpreted the statute, but also
separately with an awareness of the harm that could stem from tying
up the use of natural laws and inhibiting discovery in a field.
III. ASS’N FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
INTERPRETATION OF MAYO
Mayo has already proven impactful—and likely stands to play an
even greater role in the near future—as courts struggle to develop
consistent standards in the subject-matter eligibility arena. Its
influence was felt, although minimally, in Ass’n for Molecular
107
Pathology—a highly publicized case and the latest chapter in the

102

Id.
See id.
104
Id. at 1305.
105
Id. at 1302.
106
Id. at 1293. These concerns indicate that increased protection for discoveries
that make use of laws of nature is undesirable.
107
See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Court Rules Biotech Firm Can Patent Human Genes, WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
16,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390443324404577593251249665074.html; Jonathan Stempel, Myriad
Wins Gene Patent Ruling from US Appeals Court, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2012, 4:23 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/16/us-myriad
-patent-idUSBRE87F12K20120816 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
103
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gene-patent debate.
In the mid-1990s, researchers confirmed that mutations in the
108
BRCA1/2 genes correlated with an increased risk of developing
109
Women who inherit these genetic
breast and ovarian cancer.
mutations face up to an 85% risk of breast cancer—the second
leading cause of cancer related death among women in the United
110
States—and up to a 50% risk of ovarian cancer. BRCA1 mutations
have also been linked with cancers of the cervix, uterus, pancreas,
and colon while BRCA2 mutations have been observed to increase
the risk of developing pancreatic and stomach cancer as well as
111
melanoma.
Male carriers of the BRCA1/2 mutation face an
112
increased risk of breast and prostate cancer.
Determining the
existence of BRCA1/2 mutations is a critically important diagnostic
113
Aside from the benefits that stem from an
and preventative tool.
individual’s ability to make informed decisions relating to aspects of
their life ranging from daily activities to family planning, knowledge
of BRCA1/2 mutations enables doctors to tailor the most effective
treatment regimens for each individual patient—selecting from
minimally intrusive options such as increased surveillance, to more
114
aggressive forms of treatment like chemotherapy.
In September 1994, Myriad Genetics, Inc. (“Myriad”)—based on
its work in conjunction with researchers at the National Institute for
Environmental Health Sciences, the University of Utah, McGill
108

See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER
INST., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA#r5 (last updated
May 29, 2009) (stating that the names BRCA1 and BRCA2 stand for breast cancer
susceptibility gene 1 and 2, respectively, and explaining that tumor suppressor genes
normally function to maintain the stability of a cell’s genetic material (DNA) and
help to prevent uncontrolled cell growth).
109
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
110
Id.
111
BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, supra note 108.
112
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
113
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011),
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
114
Id.
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University, and Eli Lilly Co.—sequenced the BRCA1 gene and sought
115
By the end of 1995, Myriad filed for patents on the
to patent it.
BRCA2 gene following its work with scientists in Canada and at the
116
117
University of Pennsylvania.
As the sole licensee of the patents
related to the BRCA1/2 genes, Myriad controls all research and
118
testing on or associated with the genes and, as the benefactor of a
119
limited monopoly, charges inflated prices for the test. In addition,
Myriad has aggressively prohibited other labs from performing its
120
patented test and generally refuses to grant licenses for second
121
opinion diagnostic testing.
Studies indicate that this exclusivity
impedes research and hinders the development of improvements to
122
testing.
Myriad’s seven patents contain a total of fifteen composition and
123
method claims.
The composition claims are directed to three
different types of isolated DNA molecules including: (1) isolated
DNA sequences—identical to naturally occurring sequences—
encompassing the full length gene sequence; (2) shorter isolated
115

Id. at 202.
Id.
117
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013) (stating that the University of Utah is the owner of the patents in suit).
118
See ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/brca-faqs (last visited Apr. 23,
2013).
119
See
Genetic
Testing
Facilities
and
Cost,
BREASTCANCER.ORG,
http://www.breastcancer.org/symptoms/testing/genetic/facility_cost (last visited
Nov. 9, 2012).
120
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (referring to cease and desist letters concerning BRAC1/2 genetic
testing sent to Dr. Kazazian, the University of Pennsylvania, and the director of the
Yale DNA Diagnostics Lab).
121
Kevin E. Noonan, USPTO Holds First Hearing on “Second Opinion” Genetic Testing,
PATENT DOCS (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/02/uspto-holdshearing-on-second-opinion-genetic-testing.html (stating that Myriad generally
prevented other testing labs from performing its patented test).
122
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 206–07; Olga Bogard,
Patenting the Human Body: The Constitutionality of Gene Patents and Suggested Remedies for
Reform, 63 SMU L. REV. 1319, 1326 (2010) (stating that Myriad took an
“unprecedented [path] in the field of genetic testing” by strictly enforcing their
rights to exclude others from using their invention).
123
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 211–12.
116
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sequences of DNA—measuring as short as fifteen nucleotides; and
(3) cDNA molecules which are distinct from the naturally occurring
sequences in that their non-coding segments have been removed,
124
and they are complimentary to naturally occurring DNA. Claims 1
and 5 in Patent 5,747,282 are representative of the composition
claims at issue in this case and recite: “1. An isolated DNA coding for
a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid
sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 2 . . . 5. An isolated DNA having at
125
Isolated DNA is
least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1 . . . .”
often an essential element in many procedures to diagnose diseases
126
and detect genetic disorders.
In response to the restrictive licensing and high costs of
obtaining BRCA1/2 tests, the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), the Association for Molecular Pathology, several nonprofit women’s organizations, research scientists, and individuals
initiated a lawsuit in 2010 challenging the validity of Myriad’s patents
127
in the Southern District of New York. In a departure from what was
the common practice of upholding gene patents, Judge Sweet—
emphasizing the similarity between the function of isolated genes and
128
native DNA as carriers of information —determined that Myriad’s
composition and method claims impermissibly sought to patent
129
ineligible products of nature under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Judge Sweet,
in an effort to differentiate isolated DNA from other chemical
130
compounds that were the subjects of previous patents, pointed to

124

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011),
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
125
U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995).
126
See George Rice, DNA Extraction, http://serc.carleton.edu/microbelife
/research_methods/genomics/dnaext.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
127
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 186–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F.
App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
128
See id. at 228.
129
See id. at 238.
130
See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 496 (2d Cir. 1912),
supra note 18 (noting that chemical substances, like crystalline adrenaline, were
patent eligible).
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the dual nature of DNA—acknowledging that it is both a chemical
131
compound and also a physical carrier of genetic information.
Judge Sweet further declared that Myriad’s diagnostic method claims
were invalid because they claimed a comparison—an unpatentable
mental process—of genetic sequences to determine if differences
132
existed.
Myriad appealed to the Federal Circuit, which issued its first
133
ruling in the case on July 29, 2011.
Judge Lourie, in his majority
opinion, looked to the framework for determining patent eligibility
set out in Funk Bros. and Chakrabarthy, which asked whether the
134
subject matter at issue was “markedly different” from that which
135
exists in nature.
Judge Lourie—concluding that Myriad’s isolated
DNA met this minimum standard and was patent eligible—pointed to
136
the unique chemical structure of isolated DNA. He indicated that
Judge Sweet erred in determining patent eligibility based on a
comparison of the function of isolated and genomic DNA and
instead urged that isolated DNA be considered a distinct chemical
137
entity.
Judge Lourie also cautioned against departing from the
USPTO’s current practice of awarding gene patents and advised that
such a dramatic change in policy be initiated by the legislature and
138
not the courts.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Moore indicated that the
difference in chemical structure between isolated DNA and genomic
131

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
See id. at 233–37.
133
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011),
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
134
Id. at 1351 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)).
135
See id. at 1351.
136
See id. (contrasting isolated DNA with native DNA and explaining that:
Native DNA exists in the body as one of forty-six large, contiguous DNA
molecules. Each DNA molecule is itself an integral part of a larger
structural complex, a chromosome. In each chromosome, the DNA
molecule is packaged around histone proteins into a structure called
chromatin, which in turn is packaged into the chromosomal
structure . . . . Isolated DNA, in contrast, is a free-standing portion of a
native DNA molecule, frequently a single gene. Isolated DNA has been
cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed)
or synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally occurring DNA
molecule.).
137
See id. at 1353.
138
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1354–55.
132
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DNA was not enough, by itself, to render isolated DNA “markedly
139
different” from genomic DNA and thus patentable per se. Rather,
Judge Moore engaged in a more searching inquiry, asking “whether
these differences impart a new utility which makes [isolated DNA]
140
markedly different from nature.”
He concluded that shorter
isolated DNA segments were clearly patent eligible given they are
particularly well-suited to accomplish a number of tasks that genomic
141
DNA could not accomplish.
Judge Moore conceded that larger
isolated DNA fragments presented a more difficult question of patent
142
eligibility,
because although they have the same chemical
characteristics as shorter isolated fragments, they do not retain the
143
Nonetheless, Judge Moore concluded that because
same utility.
Congress has generally “authorized an expansive scope of patentable
subject matter,” and the USPTO has allowed patents on isolated DNA
for decades, these settled expectations of patent law “tip[ped] the
144
scale in favor of patentability.”
Judge Bryson’s dissent maintained that Myriad’s composition
145
claims were categorically directed to unpatentable subject matter.
In an approach similar to the one adopted by Judge Sweet in his
district court opinion, Judge Bryson’s holding was based on an
understanding that the chemical differences between isolated and
genomic DNA were of secondary importance to the actual function of
isolated and genomic DNA—which both operate to transfer
146
information.
Judge Bryson rebutted the majority’s reliance on
USPTO precedent by pointing out that the USPTO’s guidelines are
139

See id. at 1364–65 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 1365.
141
See id. (explaining that while “[smaller isolated DNA] sequences can be used
as primers in a diagnostic screening process to detect gene mutations . . . [and] as
the basis for probes . . . [n]aturally occurring DNA cannot be used to accomplish
these same goals”).
142
See id. at 1366 (defining “longer strand” as a piece of isolated DNA containing
“most or all of the entire gene” and stating that “[l]onger strands of isolated DNA, in
particular isolated strands which include most or all of the entire gene, are a much
closer case”).
143
See id. (noting that longer isolated segments are unsuitable as primers which
are typically only 100–1,000 bases in length).
144
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011),
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
145
See id. at 1373.
146
See id. at 1378.
140
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not entitled to significant weight, as indicated by the Supreme
Court’s refusal to adhere to the guidelines—which stated that
microorganisms were not patent eligible at the time they decided
147
Chakrabarty. Furthermore, Judge Bryson noted that the Department
of Justice—which speaks for the executive branch, to which the
USPTO belongs—filed a brief taking the position that Myriad’s
148
composition claims were not eligible for patenting.
Judge Bryson
further raised policy arguments in support of his determination that
isolated DNA should not be patent eligible—including concerns
about the preemptive force of Myriad’s broad claims on “the next
149
generation of innovation in genetic medicine . . . .”
The Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold Myriad’s composition
claims directed to isolated human DNA marked a victory not only for
Myriad, but also for the entire biotechnology industry. Following the
court’s decision, the ACLU petitioned the Federal Circuit to review
the decision, arguing that the court “erred in failing to consider
whether the DNA fragments claimed in these patents are products of
150
nature.” When the Federal Circuit declined to accept the petition
151
for a rehearing, the ACLU filed a petition for writ of certiorari.
Less than a week after its decision in Mayo was announced, the
Supreme Court granted the pending petition for a writ of
152
certiorari.
The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and
remanded the case to that court for “further consideration in light of
153
[Mayo].”
Although the Federal Circuit’s second Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology decision purports to evaluate the effect of Mayo on the
patent eligibility of the isolated DNA at issue in Ass’n for Molecular

147

See id. at 1380–81.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853320, at *10 (“[I]solated but
otherwise unaltered genomic DNA is not patent-eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.”).
149
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
150
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing, Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No.
2010-1406), 2011 WL 5057016, at *1.
151
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics Inc., (No. 11-725), 2011 WL 6257250.
152
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794,
1794 (2012).
153
Id.
148
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154

Pathology, in fact, it only glancingly acknowledged the Supreme
Court’s Mayo decision. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its
holding that the composition claims covering isolated DNA
sequences associated with predisposition to breast and ovarian
155
cancers were directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT FAILED TO INCORPORATE MAYO INTO ASS’N
FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY
The Federal Circuit summarized its primary rationale for its
dismissive treatment of Mayo on remand by stating that: “[t]he
principal claims of the patents before us on remand relate to isolated
DNA molecules. Mayo does not control the question of patent156
eligibility of such claims.”
In other words, the Federal Circuit
largely disregarded Mayo because Mayo dealt with the patent
eligibility of method claims while the claims at issue in Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology were directed to compositions of matter. Notably, as
discussed infra, neither Supreme Court nor Federal Circuit precedent
supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different types of claims as
157
each having their own distinct set of concerns.
In fact, the Court
has indicated that, in the process of determining whether certain
categories of claims are eligible for patenting, it is appropriate to
draw upon concerns raised in dealing with one category of claim and
consider their applicability in the context of another type of claim.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Gottschalk v. Benson and Bilski v.
Kappos are illustrative of the Court’s practice of applying concerns
158
across claim types.
The claimed invention in Benson was a “method for converting
159
binary coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.”
The claims professed to cover any use of the method in any apparatus
160
or machine of any type. While the claims were initially rejected by
the USPTO—and then by the Board of Patent Appeals—they were
154

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013). (“Our decision on remand . . . both decides the issues that were before
us in the original appeal and evaluates the effect of Mayo on those issues.”).
155
See id. at 1326.
156
Id. at 1325.
157
See infra notes 158–174 and accompanying text.
158
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972).
159
Id. at 64.
160
See id.
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upheld by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
The Acting
162
In arriving at
Commissioner of Patents then obtained certiorari.
the conclusion that a computer program—without substantial
practical application except in association with a computer—was not
a patentable process, the Court repeated its frequently expressed
concern that “phenomena of nature . . . mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic
163
tools of scientific and technological work.”
The Court cautioned
that “[upholding] the patent would wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on
164
the algorithm itself.”
The Court went on to quote its Funk Bros.
decision, stating that “[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the
165
law recognizes.” The Court continued, stating, “[w]e dealt [in Funk
Bros.] with a ‘product claim,’ while the present case deals with a
166
‘process’ claim. But we think the same principle applies.”
The Court’s reasoning regarding the preemptive effect on the
mathematical formula that would result from upholding the patent in
Benson is analogous to the preemptive effect on the genetic code that
would result from upholding Myriad’s composition claims. In the
same way that upholding the patent on the mathematical formula in
Benson—which “ha[d] no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer”—would have wholly preempted
the use of the mathematical formula, upholding Myriad’s
composition claims directed to genes—the only physical
embodiments of the genetic code—would effectively preempt the use
167
of the genetic code.
Thus, Benson can be read to caution against
upholding patents that would have broad preemptive effects in a field
by allowing courts to impute concerns previously attributable only to
a certain type of claim and to consider them in the context of
different claim types.
Bilski, like Benson, illustrates the notion that concerns raised in
the context of one type of claim are applicable to other claim types.
In attempting to clarify the plurality opinion, Justice Stevens’s
161

Application of Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
See Benson, 409 U.S. at 63.
163
Id. at 67.
164
Id. at 72.
165
Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)).
166
Id. at 67–68.
167
Id. at 71.
162
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concurrence highlighted a number of perceived deficiencies in the
168
Stevens placed the
Court’s analysis of subject-matter eligibility.
plurality’s suggestion that “the [subject-matter eligibility] analysis
169
turns on the category of patent involved” among those deficiencies.
Stevens, instead, maintained that “we have never in the past
suggested that the [patent-eligible subject matter] inquiry varies by
170
subject matter.”
Finally—despite its departure from this concept in its Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology opinion on remand—even the Federal Circuit has
explicitly recognized that the scope of a 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis
171
should not be limited by the claim type.
In AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., the court stated that “we consider the scope of §
101 to be the same regardless of the form—machine or process—in
172
which a particular claim is drafted.” The court acknowledged that
“the Supreme Court’s decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Flook, all of
which involved method (i.e., process) claims, have provided and
supported the principles which we apply to both machine-and
173
process-type claims.”
The Federal Circuit went on to apply its
reasoning from two cases dealing with composition claims to the
174
method claims at issue in the case before it.
Therefore, Benson, Bilski, and AT&T can be read to contravene
the Federal Circuit’s primary rationale for its dismissive treatment of
Mayo—that Mayo dealt with method claims while Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology deals with composition claims. These cases provide clear
examples of instances where courts recognized the universal
applicability of the concerns raised in the context of one type of
claim and considered the implications of those concerns in the
context of another type of claim. Instead of recognizing that the
168

See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3234–36 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 3236.
170
Id.
171
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring) cert. granted in part, 133 S.
Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (acknowledging that “the Prometheus
discussion of laws of nature (process claims) clearly ought to apply equally to
manifestations of nature (composition claims). Myriad’s argument that Prometheus is
constrained to methods is an untenable position.”). Notably, Judge Moore did not
modify her analysis to reflect this statement on remand and joined Judge Lourie in
upholding Myriad’s patents. Id.
172
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
173
See id.
174
See id.
169
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concerns the Court raised in Mayo in the context of method claims
were applicable to composition claims, the Federal Circuit ignored
this instruction from precedent and chose to consider different claim
types in isolation.
In arriving at its conclusion that Myriad’s isolated DNA
molecules were patent eligible, the Federal Circuit also erred in
175
confining its analysis to Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty —from which the
court gleaned the “markedly different” test for determining the
176
patent eligibility of compositions of matter.
This error becomes
apparent upon considering the Supreme Court’s repeated
disinclination to adhere to rigid tests developed by the Federal
Circuit in favor of more nuanced and holistic analyses. The dynamic
between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in the two cases
is indicative of the common approach employed by the Court when
faced with a decision of whether or not to adhere to a mechanical test
proffered by the Federal Circuit.
For instance, as discussed earlier, the Court chose not to adopt
the Federal Circuit’s exclusive application of the M or T test to
determine whether the subject matter at issue in Prometheus’s
177
patents was eligible for patenting.
KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. is
also representative of the Court’s practice of declining to adhere to
the rigid tests for deciding issues of patentablity as applied by the
178
Federal Circuit.
Although the issue presented in KSR concerned
whether the claimed invention was obvious—another obstacle to
patentability—the Federal Circuit has explicitly weighed
considerations from the obviousness context into the calculus for
179
determining patent eligiblity under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In KSR, the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s application of the
teaching, suggestion, or motivation (“TSM”) test for obviousness was
175

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326 (“Chakrabarty and Funk
Brothers set out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of
compositions of matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”).
176
See Chakrabarty, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
177
See sources cited, supra notes 57–103 and accompanying text.
178
See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
179
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011) Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011),
reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal
reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (casting Funk Bros.—a case decided on
obviousness—in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to serve as a comparison to the subject
matter at issue in Chakrabarty).
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overly rigid, and the Court urged that any approach to deciding
180
issues of obviousness be flexible. As applied by the Federal Circuit,
the TSM test was the principal mechanism for determining whether a
claimed invention was obvious by looking for a teaching, suggestion,
or motivation to combine certain existing inventions in a manner
181
that yielded the claimed invention. If such a teaching, suggestion,
182
or motivation were found, the invention would be obvious.
In holding that the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the
TSM test in KSR was in error, the Supreme Court stated that the
Court’s precedent “set[s] forth an expansive and flexible approach
[for determining obviousness that is] inconsistent with the way the
183
[Federal Circuit] applied its TSM test here.”
The Court further
characterized the TSM test as a “helpful insight,” but cautioned that
“[h]elpful insights . . . need not become rigid and mandatory
184
formulas.” The Court then stated that “when a court transforms [a]
general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry,
185
as the [Federal Circuit] did here, it errs.”
Thus, Mayo and KSR demonstrate the Federal Circuit’s
commitment to advancing rigid frameworks and the Supreme Court’s
repeated insistence in response that the tests proffered by the Federal
Circuit not be dispositive on the issues of patent eligibility under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and obviousness, but rather that they occupy a small
portion of the calculus toward reaching a workable conclusion. The
Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to the “markedly different” test,
which it gleaned from Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty, provided the
Supreme Court with yet another chance to reject the court’s narrow
analysis in favor of a much more nuanced and fact specific
determination. For instance, neither Funk Bros. nor Chakrabarty
analyzed the impact of issuing a patent to the claimed invention on
the public or the risk of tying up the use of natural laws.
In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, the Federal Circuit went to great
lengths to divorce its decision from policy considerations. Before
engaging in an analysis of whether Myriad’s composition claims
directed to isolated DNA were patent eligible, the Federal Circuit
cautioned that “it is important to state what this appeal is not
180
181
182
183
184
185

See KSR Intern. Co., 550 U.S. at 419.
See id. at 418.
See id.
See id. at 415.
Id. at 419.
Id.
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186

about.” The Federal Circuit contended that the Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology case was “not about whether individuals suspected of having
an increased risk of developing breast cancer are entitled to a second
187
opinion.” Nor was the case about “whether the . . . owner of the . . .
patents, or Myriad, the exclusive licensee . . . acted improperly in its
188
licensing or enforcement policies with respect to the patents.” The
court also contended that the appeal was not about “whether is it
[sic] desirable for one company to hold a patent or license covering a
189
test that may save people’s lives . . . .”
But in Mayo—which the
Supreme Court intended to guide the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology on remand—the Court did not consider
the issue of patent eligibility in a vacuum. Rather, it examined the
landscape of patent eligibility from a position that fully accounted for
the policy implications of its decision, paying particular attention to
its concern that awarding a patent may tie up the use of natural laws
190
in an area.
This broad view of the question of subject-matter
eligibility was the essence of the Court’s holding in Mayo, and this
marriage of precedent with policy is disturbingly absent from the
Federal Circuit’s first and second Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
opinions.
Finally, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the statement from
Chakrabarty in support of an extraordinarily broad scope of patenteligible subject matter—which indicates that, “[t]he Committee
Reports accompanying the 1952 [Patent] Act inform us that Congress
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun
191
that is made by man’”—is misplaced.
The full quote from the
Committee Reports teaches a far more limited understanding of the
scope of patentable subject matter. The full quote instructs that, “[a]
person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may
include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of

186

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
191
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 821979, at 5 (1952)); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
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192

[this] title are fulfilled.” As the Supreme Court cautioned when it
heard Chakrabarty, “[t]his [quote] is not to suggest that § 101 has no
193
limits or that it embraces every discovery.”
Had the Federal Circuit not dismissed the concerns the
Supreme Court expressed in Mayo as applicable only to method
claims, and instead accounted for the implications of tying up the use
of the natural laws in the calculus for determining patent eligibility, it
would likely have concluded that Myriad’s claims to isolated DNA
were not patent eligible. The Federal Circuit would have had to look
no further than to the district court’s Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
opinion to get a sense of the dramatic impact that awarding patents
on the isolated DNA had among patients, researchers, and other
194
groups.
Research has shown that gene patents have “persistent negative
195
effects on subsequent scientific research.”
The possibility of
obtaining patent protection for discoveries related to genetic
research largely does not motivate scientists to conduct research and
as a result, “patents are not needed for much of U.S. basic genetic
196
research to occur.” One of the primary purposes of the U.S. patent
system—full disclosure of a claimed invention—is already
accomplished by “the norms of academic science” which encourage

192

See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3249 (2010) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979,
at 5; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6) (emphasis added).
193
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
194
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d. 181, 208–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F.
App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (describing the effects of Myriad’s gene patents on
researchers who stopped BRCA1/2 testing upon receiving cease-and-desist letters
regarding the patents in suit, doctors who are unable to disseminate the results of
patients’ BRCA1/2 tests, genetic counselors who are unable to send patient samples
to laboratories other than Myriad for testing, and patients who are unable to pay the
full cost of BRCA1/2 tests out of pocket if the tests are not covered by insurance).
195
See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012
WL 2215682, at *11 (quoting Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and
Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16213, 2010)).
196
See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Gene Patents and Licensing Practices
and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests: Report of the
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, at 2 (2010), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf.
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full disclosure of research results in peer reviewed journals.
As
much as forty six percent of labs conducting genetic research feel
198
The
that gene patents either delayed or limited their research.
exclusive rights conferred by gene patents do not result in faster
genetic test development nor are they necessary for the development
199
of genetic tests to detect rare genetic diseases. In fact, the discovery
of the BRCA1/2 genes was made possible by substantial funding from
the National Institutes of Health and through the use of well-known
sequencing techniques by teams of scientists—some of whom were
200
resolutely opposed to patenting the BRCA1/2 genes.
Some
researchers have characterized DNA patents as “difficult, if not
201
impossible, to circumvent” because the patents often foreclose
research on both the effects of the DNA sequence and the naturally
202
occurring gene.
Regarding the effects of gene patents on patients seeking
patented therapies, research has indicated that “where patents and
licensing practices have created a sole provider of a genetic test,
203
patient access to those tests has suffered in a number of ways.”
First, when a sole-provider of a genetic test does not accept a patient’s
insurance, the cost of obtaining the test often proves prohibitive for
204
large numbers of patients.
Second, in situations where gene
patents have created a sole-provider, patients are unable to obtain an
205
independent second opinion on test results. It has been recognized
197

Id.
See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012
WL 2215682, at *10–11.
199
U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 196.
200
See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, Information Society Project at Yale Law
School Scholars in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406),
2012 WL 2885885, at *5–6.
201
Isabelle Huys, et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 907 (2009).
202
See Brief for Knowledge Ecology International and Universities Allied for
Essential Medicines as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Supporting
Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012 WL 2885874, at *7.
203
Brief of Professor Eileen M. Kane as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 476049, at *25.
204
See id.
205
See id. at *44 (explaining that “[t]he legal complaint filed against Myriad
names one plaintiff who would have liked a second opinion on her BRCA1/BRCA2
genetic test results but instead had to make major medical decisions based on the
198
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that “[c]onfirmatory testing by another laboratory is the ‘laboratory
equivalent to the time-honored practice of obtaining a second
206
Sole-providers of genetic tests that
opinion from a clinician.’”
aggressively enforce their patents could cause additional access
207
problems for patients. In one instance, patients with familial long
QT syndrome—a life-threatening condition—were unable to receive
testing for the condition for an eighteen month period because the
patent holder had not yet developed a commercial genetic test but
sought to exclude others from infringing on its patent by providing a
208
similar test. Although scientists identified targeted cancer therapies
effective in treating those with BRCA mutations years ago, evidence
suggests that BRCA1/2 gene patents have hindered the availability of
209
treatments.
Finally, gene patents often have deteriorative effects on genetic
210
test quality. A researcher opined that “the most robust method for
assuring quality in laboratory testing is through ‘comparison of
211
results obtained on samples shared between different labs.’”
Competition among multiple laboratories offering genetic testing for
the same indication often acts as a catalyst for improvements in test
quality and for the development of more thorough testing
212
techniques. Sample sharing and competition often do not occur in
environments where a sole-provider of a genetic test prevents others
Myriad test results alone”).
206
Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and
Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711, at *7
(describing one of the plaintiffs in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology who was unable to
obtain a second opinion on the results of her BRCA1/2 tests results and was forced
to make major medical decisions—such as whether to pursue the treatment options
of a mastectomy or oophorectomy (ovary removal)—based on the results of a single
test).
207
See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 196.
208
Id. at 3–4, 40 (describing other instances where exclusive rights have been
enforced as a means for preventing clinical laboratories from offering genetic
testing).
209
See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012
WL 2215682, at *10 (quoting Susan M. Domcheck et al., Challenges to the Development
of New Agents for Molecularly Defined Patient Subsets: Lessons from BRCA1/2 – Associated
Breast Cancer, 29 J. ON CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4224 (2011)).
210
See Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and
Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711, at *4.
211
Id. at 8.
212
See id.
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from providing testing.
A 2006 study of 300 individuals who
received negative test results from Myriad’s BRAC test, despite
coming from families comprised of individuals with four or more
members that had breast or ovarian cancer, concluded that “genetic
testing . . . does not provide all available information to women at
risk . . . [since] 12% of those from high risk families with
breast/ovarian cancer and with negative . . . commercial genetic test
results for [BRCA1/2] nonetheless carry cancer-predisposing
214
[mutations] in one of these genes.” The study went on to note that
because of the expense and invasiveness of corrective procedures—
such as a mastectomy—inaccurate BRCA1/2 test results coupled with
a patient’s inability to secure a second opinion can have particularly
215
negative consequences.
V. ESTABLISHING A WAY FORWARD
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court elected to grant
certiorari in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, following the Federal
Circuit’s cursory review of the impact of Mayo on the issues presented
216
in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology.
In agreeing to hear the case,
however, the Court chose not to review whether the Federal Circuit
erred in finding Mayo and Ass’n for Molecular Pathology irreconcilable,
nor did the Court confine itself to addressing the issue of whether the
petitioners lacked standing to challenge the validity of Myriad’s
217
Rather, the Court elected to review the broadest of the
patents.
three questions raised by the petitioner, namely, “[a]re human genes
218
patentable?” The fact that the Court chose to address this question
suggested that the answer cannot be gleaned merely from the text of
section 101. Presumably, the process of developing an answer to the
extraordinarily broad question of whether human genes are
213

Id.
Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and
Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711, at *5–6
(quoting Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and
TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1379 (2006).
215
See id. at 6.
216
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
217
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 4502947.
218
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695
(2012); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 4502947, at *2.
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patentable would have entailed an extra-statutory analysis of the
issues. Such an analysis should have been fresh in the Court’s mind
after its decision in Mayo—where the Court carefully entertained a
traditional section 101 analysis while simultaneously stepping away
from the statute to account for the policy implications of its decision,
concluding that the Prometheus patents were not directed to patent219
eligible subject matter.
Of particular concern to the unanimous Court in Mayo was the
inhibitory effect that upholding the Prometheus patents would have
on subsequent developments in the field of thiopurine
220
administration. The Court noted that the patents “threaten[ed] to
inhibit
the
development
of
more
refined
treatment
recommendations . . . that combine Prometheus’s correlations with
later discovered features of metabolites, human physiology or
individual patient characteristics.” This concern should have applied
with equal or greater force to Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents because
while the Court emphasized that Prometheus’s patents threatened to
inhibit the development of subsequent treatments, Myriad’s patents
have already had a substantial preemptive effect on further genetic
221
research, genetic test development, and patient access to testing.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
decision failed to provide authority for considering policy
222
implications in the section 101 analysis.
Of course, in order to use Mayo as authority for an extrastatutory analysis of whether certain subject matter is patent eligible,
the Court must have been satisfied that the considerations it
advanced in Mayo are not limited to method claims. Although the
claims at issue in Mayo were directed toward a method of
administering thiopurines, the Court made no representations that
the concerns it raised in Mayo were limited to the method claim
context—contrary to the Federal Circuit’s argument in Ass’n for
223
Molecular Pathology on remand.
Instead, it is likely that the Court
219

See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302
(2012).
221
See sources cited, supra notes 195–215 and accompanying text.
222
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
223
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
220
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recognized that questions of subject-matter eligibility are often
extremely complex, and that some cases merit a more in-depth
consideration of the varied effects of upholding patents on certain
subject matter. Relying primarily on Benson, Bilski, and AT&T, which
all support the notion that concerns raised in the context of one type
of claim are applicable in the context of another, the Court should
have emphasized that Mayo is particularly applicable to the issues in
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology. Such a finding would have enabled the
Court to weigh the significant policy implications of affording human
genes patent protection—including the substantial preemptive effect
such protection would have on future studies of patented human
genes—and would have ultimately led the Court to the same
224
conclusion it announced in its recent opinion.
The Supreme Court handed down its Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
225
decision on June 13, 2013.
Justice Thomas, who authored the
opinion, was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
226
Ginsberg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Scalia filed
a three sentence opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
227
judgment.
The Court held that genomic DNA does not become
228
patent eligible under section 101 merely by being isolated.
The Court acknowledged that Myriad did not in any way create
or alter the genetic information actually encoded in the BRCA1 and
229
BRCA2 genes.
Rather, the Court characterized Myriad’s principal
contribution as simply “uncovering the precise location and genetic
sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes within chromosomes 17
230
and 13.” The Court stated that despite the extensive effort required
to isolate the genes at issue, that effort alone was “insufficient to
231
The Court declined to adopt
satisfy the demands of § 101.”
Myriad’s argument that the process of isolating genes—which
requires researchers to sever covalent bonds—sufficiently transforms
232
the isolated genetic material. The Court noted that the language of
224

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) (concluding
that isolated human genes are not patent eligible).
225
See id.
226
Id. at 2110.
227
Id. at 2120.
228
See id.
229
See id. at 2116.
230
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013).
231
Id. at 2118.
232
See id.
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Myriad’s claims was directed to the genetic information contained in
233
the BRCA1/2 genes and not the chemical structure of the genes.
The Court identified additional language in Myriad’s patents which
tended to show that Myriad’s invention was primarily merely an
unpatentable discovery, including assertions that the location of the
genes was unknown until Myriad found it and Myriad’s extensive
234
description of the process it used to “discover” the genes.
Noticeably absent from the Court’s opinion, however, is any
consideration of the policy implications that would have resulted
from extending patent protection to the BRCA1/2 genes. This
failure to account for important policy concerns in the section 101
analysis is unfortunate. Mayo perfectly set the table for the idea that
policy considerations should be weighed into the section 101
235
analysis, but the Court’s opinion fails to consider how individuals
may be physically harmed by the exclusionary effect of patents after a
patent-eligibility determination. The Court’s failure to define the
appropriate role of policy considerations in the section 101 inquiry
after Mayo will leave lower courts uncertain about the appropriate
weight to afford these important policy factors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion suggested that when the
Court considered whether human genes are patentable, it would take
a broad view of the implications of its decision and ultimately weigh
the well-documented effects of tying up the use of natural laws in this
area into the calculus for determining whether this unique subject
matter is patent eligible. This concept was bolstered by the Court’s
explicit recognition in Benson and Bilski that the analysis of subjectmatter eligibility should not be narrowly confined to comparisons
between identical claim types and by the Court’s repudiation of the
Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to inflexible standards for patent
eligibility and obviousness in Mayo and KSR, respectively. While the
Court ultimately concluded that isolated human genes are not
eligible for patenting, and thus that Myriad’s claims directed to
isolated BRCA1/2 DNA are not patent eligible, the Court failed to
address important policy factors that favored a finding of patent
ineligibility. The Court should have noted that declining to extend
patent protection to human genes will positively impact genetic test
233
234
235

See id.
See id.
See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
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quality, test development, and patient access to genetic tests.
Importantly, such a ruling would have also provided lower courts with
a clearer picture of the appropriate subject-matter eligibility analysis
for various forms of isolated DNA. The ideal patent-eligibility analysis
requires courts to satisfy the threshold requirements set forth in
section 101, but also demands forward-looking considerations of the
preemptive effects of granting patent protection.

